Promises, Impositions, and other Directionals by Bergstra, Jan A. & Burgess, Mark
ar
X
iv
:1
40
1.
33
81
v1
  [
cs
.M
A]
  1
4 J
an
 20
14
Promises, Impositions, and other Directionals
Jan A. Bergstra
Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam∗
Mark Burgess
CFEngine†
Abstract
Promises, impositions, proposals, predictions, and suggestions are catego-
rized as voluntary co-operational methods. The class of voluntary co-operational
methods is included in the class of so-called directionals. Directionals are mech-
anisms supporting the mutual coordination of autonomous agents.
Notations are provided capable of expressing residual fragments of direction-
als. An extensive example, involving promises about the suitability of programs
for tasks imposed on the promisee is presented. The example illustrates the dy-
namics of promises and more specifically the corresponding mechanism of trust
updating and credibility updating. Trust levels and credibility levels then deter-
mine the way certain promises and impositions are handled.
The ubiquity of promises and impositions is further demonstrated with two
extensive examples involving human behaviour: an artificial example about an
agent planning a purchase, and a realistic example describing technology medi-
ated interaction concerning the solution of pay station failure related problems
arising for an agent intending to leave a parking area.
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1 Introduction
The objectives of this paper are diverse, including the following:
1. to discuss in some detail the dynamics of promises assuming the statics of
promises to have been assessed to some satisfactory extent in [3].1
2. To add impositions to the theory of promises thus achieving higher symmetry.
An imposition is an invitation for voluntary cooperation.
Impositions are most plausible in contexts where the target agent of an imposi-
tion has in advance promised the corresponding source of the imposition of its
willingness to receive and to subsequently effectuate a sufficiently large class of
impositions.
3. To add proposals, predictions, suggestions, and warnings as methods for induc-
ing voluntary cooperation similar to though different from promises and impo-
sitions.
Incorporation of these further methods allows for a more flexible application of
promises and impositions in human management and organization. For instance
predictions play a role when knowledge about an environment must be shared
between different agents. Suggestions and proposals are exchanged during pre-
liminary stages in advance of an exchange of promises and impositions.
4. To collect promises, impositions, proposals, predictions, suggestions, and warn-
ings into a category of so-called co-op (short for co-operational) methods which
share to a large extent options for formal description as well as life-cycle models
and method dynamics. Penalties for non-compliance play no role in the setting
of voluntary co-operational methods. Below voluntary co-op methods will be re-
ferred to as “directionals”. Directionals constitute a larger class of methods for
achieving coordination between autonomous agents including messages, hints,
smiles, outcries, alarms.
5. To provide examples of promises and other directionals that demonstrate the
interaction with trust maintenance which in turn is the key to promise dynamics.
And to collect a number of additional attributes of promises that are helpful for
an understanding of promise dynamics.
We follow the initial development of [7, 8, 10] for an approach to a theory of
promises with a principled emphasis on agent autonomy. A simple notation for promises,
involving four components: a promiser, a promisee, a promise type, and a promise
1The role of autonomy for agents acting upon the reception of decision outcomes has not been
brought into focus in my work [1] on outcome oriented decision taking and in these papers the possibility
that decision outcomes imply obligations for other agents is left open.
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body, provides remarkable expressive power. A range of examples has been put for-
ward that demonstrates the virtue of the use of promises for system specification and
understanding.
In [3] that work has been extended in the direction of providing conceptually richer
definitions of core concepts. In [3] no attempt was made to specify dynamic aspects of
promises except for the general observation that a promise will be assessed by agents
in its scope. The idea of promise keeping is considered implicit in the outcomes of
assessments rather than to be recovered from some objective form of observation or
even logic.
Contemplating promise dynamics below will lead to the identification of a number
of features that may be attached to promises on top of the four components mentioned
above. This in turn leads us to the specification of a variety of promise statement
notations extending the expressive power of the base notation from [7, 8] and [10].
At a closer inspection promise dynamics, as well as imposition dynamics, and the
dynamics of other directionals is dominated by levels of mutual trust between agents
and the design and implementation of trust maintenance functionality. This is illus-
trated in an extensive example about the usage of computer programs in relation to the
trust level of a consultant advising other agents about the use of that software.
In Appendix A an example is provided which indicates that for a simple plan in-
volving a few actions only a multitude to promises, counter promises, proposals, and
suggestions may be issued. This example illustrates the importance of promises for
plan formation. In Appendix B an extensive case study is provided which illustrates
that promises may be useful for the explanation of service architectures and of diffi-
culties arising during service delivery. The use of promises seems to be unavoidable
in this case, which increases our confidence in the role that promises may play in the
description of systems involving human-machine interaction.
1.1 Liberating promises from the connotation of obligation
A design decision that underlies promise theory is to liberate the concept of a promise
from the connotation, or implicit expectation, that a promise correlates one to one
with an obligation. In [3] several arguments have been put forward why that so-called
non-obligationist conception of promising may be of practical value, both inside and
outside computing.
The main reason for disentangling promises from obligations is that in a world of
autonomous agents promising is unproblematic, whereas obliging is not. One agent
imposing an obligation on another agent may be understood as an impairment of the
second agent’s autonomy. This objection against promises being strongly coupled with
obligations depends on a conception of obligations that may be questioned. Although
the decoupling of promises and obligations has been dealt with extensively in [3] we
feel that more ought to be said. Below we will outline how some promissory obliga-
tions may be understood as bundles of promises.
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1.2 Impositions and impository obligations
Another common source of obligations arises when one agent commands another to
perform some action which the “must be” performed. However, just as with promises
one may remove the connotation of obligation from a command. We will speak of an
imposition instead. An imposition is issued by an impositioner to an impositionee.
Unfortunately “imposition” has a negative connotation because an imposition is
generally understood to be be unwanted by its target agent. Nevertheless there is a
striking congruence between impositions and promises because source, target, scope,
type, and body, each make sense in similar ways.
Just as to each promise a promissory obligation can be found which grasps what is
obliged to the promiser (which may be nothing), one may find an impository obligation
for an imposition which collects that what becomes an obligation to the impositionee
upon the imposition being issued. In many cases the impository obligation is empty.
1.2.1 Liberating impositions from the connotation of unfairness
After undoing “imposition” from its connotation of unfairness, if only in the context
of promise theory, an imposition becomes a symmetric counterpart to a promise. In
order to have a perfect symmetry the preferable interpretation is thus:
1. Promise: act of promising, event of promise issuing, resulting in a promise out-
come,
2. Promise outcome: essence, or merely description, of what has been promised.
The promise outcome is specified as a component of a promise statement in the
so-called promise body. A promise outcome equals an imposition enacted by
the promiser towards itself.
3. Imposition: the result of an act/event of imposing. An imposition may be either
external or it may be self-imposed (a self-imposition created upon a promise),
4. Imposition event/action: source agent tells target agent what to do, what to
achieve, what must be the state of affairs the the target must see to that is reached.
1.2.2 Impositions as a tool for autonomous agents
Now the vital step is to mobilize an “imposition” for interaction between autonomous
agents. This requires a number of assumptions:
• There is no underlying hierarchical structure that explains or governs who may
impose on whom. A may say to B, “please open that door for me”, and that can
happen for all agents A and B (assuming these agents deal with doors).
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• An imposition of A on B should not be understood as an attack by A on B.
Rather an imposition constitutes an attempt by A to induce voluntary coopera-
tion for a certain objective or course of events from B.
• Suppose that A imposes p to B, then B may degrade its respect for A, respect
being an additional status feature besides credibility and trust. If B fails to com-
ply with p thenA may degrade either its respect or its trust ofB. And conversely
if B subsequent behavior achieves p.
• B may be happy to comply with an imposition p issued by A. For instance if
A says to B: “our chairperson C is delayed, and you chair the opening session
of this conference now”, then B might be honored and very willing to do so. B
might also be embarrassed, there is no way to tell in advance.
• For an agent B the collection of all open impositions (as were issued by any
agents including B by way of its promises), represents a to do list which B can
act upon, depending on its own preferences, which take into account the impact
of B actions on other agent’s respect and trust for B, as eel as B’s reputation in
general.
• A’s issuing an “unfair” imposition on B is reflected by, potentially a decrease
of respect and/or trust in A from B, and from other agents in scope of the act
of imposition. There is no need to have a definition or description of fairness or
unfairness other than what may be derived from how different agents update their
trust and respect of A upon the imposition being issued. Promise and imposition
are equally neutral.
1.2.3 Imposition strength levels
Various different imperatives indicate different strength levels of impositions: you
must immediately X , you must under all circumstances perform X , you must X , I
request you to X , you should X , you ought to X , can you please X now, can you
please X , I would appreciate if you X , you are advised to X .
1.3 Neutralism, non-obligationism for impositions
The view on impositions put forward above may be termed “neutralism with respect
to impositions”, where neutrality is meant to replace the connotation of unfairness for
imposition that all dictionaries indicate.
In [3] a viewpoint towards promises has been worked out that was termed non-
obligationism. This view implies that a promise need not be characterized by its
promissory obligation. As a stronger view on the independence of the concept of
promises from obligations, strong non-obligationism was put forward as the viewpoint
that the concept of promises may be introduced without making any use of the concept
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of an obligation. Non-obligationism being somewhat problematic in certain examples,
restricted non-obligationism was put forward as the viewpoint that for a large class
of promises, sufficiently large to be of vital importance for the coordination of multi-
agent systems, (i) obligations are not needed as a foundational basis, (ii) promissory
obligations need not characterize the essence of a promise, and (iii) promissory obli-
gations may in turn be explained in terms of combinations of promises.
Similarly non-obligationism in the case of impositions amounts to the viewpoint
that an imposition need not be characterized by its impository obligation.
1.4 Examples of impositions
Here are some examples of impositions (from A to B) that make perfect sense among
autonomous agents. It is reasonable that the imposition comes along with some mo-
tivation. In many cases an imposition can alternatively, though not always more con-
vincingly, be understood as a conditional promise.
1. You must pay 50 BTC on Bitcoin accountX within one week (that is before date
d1), otherwise your web sites (with addresses w1, w2) will suffer a DDoS attack
launched from 10.000 bots for the duration of two weeks, starting at d1.
2. You must pay 10.000 EUR on account Y before date d2 to settle the debt caused
by event E.
3. You must push the third button from above (as part of a protocol for entering a
secured site).
4. You must now take the return money from the cash register outlet.
5. In the coming week you should issue a formal request for reimbursement of your
travel costs of last month (so that the money can be transferred to you in time).
6. You must be careful not driving too fast because police in watching closely a
few kilometers from here.
7. You must not take the usual way to your work in order to avoid a massive traffic
jam.
8. You must be home at 8.00 PM when dinner starts (our guests arrive at 7.30 and
they must leave around 9.30 PM, so please be on time).
9. Please send us your name and the usernames and passwords for your gmail ac-
counts so that we can help you to improve the structure of the classification of
your email history. (We are well-known service providers for people having dif-
ficulties with dealing with too much email; please check our credentials on the
following site).
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2 Promises and impositions as instances of Directionals
We will use the term directional to indicate a directed communication between two
agents within a given scope consisting of the originating agent, perhaps the target
agent, and zero or more other agents. Promises and impositions are classes of direc-
tionals.2
2.1 Suggestions, proposals, warnings, and predictions
Besides promises and impositions we will distinguish four more classes of directional
utterances.
Suggestion: an option for a course of action or of a state of affairs to be achieved
which is issued by A to B. A suggestion expresses that A has in mind some
actions or sequence of events, or state of affairs, which A assumes to be possible
or reachable for B and which A expects B to contemplate as an option. A
suggestion of A to B may or may not be effectuated by B.
Warning: a warning issued by A to B is a suggestion from A to B the effectuation of
which A considers to be not fruitful either form its own perspective or from B’s
perspective.
Proposal: a suggestion from A to B the effectuation of which A considers to be fruit-
ful either form its own perspective or from B’s perspective.
Prediction: a suggestion (from A to B) that A considers likely to occur, irrespective
of B’s behavior. Predictions encode A’s knowledge about the environment and
may be used to transfer that knowledge to B.
The idea is that predictions can be used to convey reasoning patterns to other
agents. Such reasoning patterns can be helpful for agents that must determine ex-
pectations generated from promises. Here is an example.
A suggestion from A to B may induce the occurrence of a proposal from B to A
which in turn gives rise to a promise from A to B that A will cooperate with B when
B tries to carry out its proposal. Subsequently B may promise to A that it will try to
carry out the proposal and that it will make use of A’s last promise.
In Appendix A we provide an artificial example involving a large family of promises,
proposals, and suggestions.
2.1.1 Trust maintenance for directionals
Each directional will have primary side effects on the target agent’s state of cognition
(mind) and secondary side effects on the level of trust that the target agent has in the
2Searle’s directives and commissives will both qualify as subcategories of the directionals.
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originating agent. Such side effects are also plausible for other agents in the scope of
the directional.
Primary side effects are moderated by the accumulated side-effects on trust levels
of previous events. The foremost role of trust is to support target agents (and other
agents in scope) of a directional to perform expectational reasoning and planning upon
taking notice of a directional. Impact on trust levels will usually take place after as-
sessment has been made of the degree to which the directional has proven helpful or
reliable.
2.2 Voluntary co-op methods, a super-class of Directionals
Promise, imposition, warning, proposal, suggestion, and prediction, each qualify as
methods in the sense of object oriented programming, to be applied to a target agent
by a source agent. As such these are super class (in an object orientation style class
hierarchy, though a subset in a set theory style class hierarchy) of the conceivable
directionals (which may also include praise, criticism, and signaling excitement or
boredom etc.). Because the target agent is always assumed to operate in a voluntary
fashion upon being influenced by one of these methods, these methods together consti-
tute the category of voluntary cooperation oriented agent coordination methods, which
we will refer to as voluntary co-operational methods, or more briefly as voluntary co-
op methods. Below we will often speak of directionals instead of voluntary co-op
methods.
2.3 Promise dynamics: central life-cycle and peripheral life-cycle
Promise dynamics primarily refer to how a single promise moves through its life-
cycle. More distantly, promises interact in complex ways as agents maintaining various
promise bundles related to different threads of activity may generate new promises,
or rather incentives to issue new promises, as a consequence of reflection upon the
existing package of promises each promise being in its own state of its dedicated life-
cycle.
Analyzing the internal activity of agents that triggers their preparation and produc-
tion of new promises is not a part of promise theory per se. Rather promise theory
provides a language that facilitates system description while remaining uncommitted
to that kind of in depth analysis of individual agent behavior.
The central life-cycle of a promise p indicates that after it has been issued it persists
as a cognition in the minds (memories) of agents involved until on of the following
events occurs:
1. p is (observably) kept,
2. p broken, that is demonstrably not going to be kept,
3. p or withdrawn by the promiser, or
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4. p becomes outdated (faded out).
The peripheral life-cycle of a promise involves modifications of credibility and
of trust assigned to the promiser, as well as to the promise by agents in scope. The
peripheral life-cycle also involves acts of determination of plausibility (probability,
expectation value) of various possible events (by agents in scope, and in particular by
the promisee) given certain trust levels. These plausibilities are the key factor in the
reduction of uncertainty that promising may effectuate.
2.3.1 A promise life-cycle in more detail
A promise once issued moves through the stages of a promise life-cycle. Each of the
entities of the entity classes just mentioned moves through a corresponding life-cycle
as well.
1. Promise preparation.
2. Promise issuing and corresponding promise fragmentation and distribution.
3. the following steps take place concurrently for all agents in scope (each agent
taking care of its own instance of a promise fragment carrying the local name
just mentioned/generated):
(a) promise outcome credibility assessment,
(b) promiser trust assessment relative to promise outcome,
(c) promise based expectation generation,
(d) promise fading update, alternating with promise fulfillment assessment,
(e) repetition of the steps 3b, 3c, and 3d after each update of promise outcome
credibility and promiser trustworthiness, until fading threshold reached or
until promise fulfillment assessment turns positive,
(f) final update of promise credibility and promiser trust,
(g) local (for the agent) promise termination.
These steps are carried out by each agent concurrently (that is interleaved for the
same agent, concurrently with other agents) with an ongoing reputation produc-
tion and maintenance (that is exchange and update) process performed by each
agent (also outside the scope of this particular promise). Reputation updates
are caused by incoming messages reporting trust modification steps enacted by
other agents.
In particular promiser reputation influences trust assessment, which in turn in-
fluences promise fulfillment expectation assessment.
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4. Global termination of the promise once the last promise fragment (locally) car-
rying its (global but otherwise secret name) has expired.
Similar life-cycle schemes can be given for other voluntary co-op methods. We
we not write out these matters in detail, with the understanding that these are rather
straightforward.
2.4 Promises and the reduction of uncertainty
If A promises (p1) B that “A is capable of performing an action c”, that promise may
reduce uncertainty for B. Indeed upon noticing p1, B knows, modulo its trust inA that
c is doable.
If A promises (p2) B with a significant scope S including B that “A will not per-
form action c”, then, if B prefers c to occur it needs to look for other ways, for in-
stance performing c itself. ClearlyB’s uncertainty is reduced once more by this second
promise.
We assume that some agents in S won’t applaud that c takes place, even if B is
expected to be happy about that event.
Now suppose that A promises (p3) B that “A will support B if B performs c” with
only B in scope of promise p3.
At once B needs to be very careful. If B fails to notice that the third promise has
a very small scope, B may judge that an additional incentive (namely the increased
support for A after B has performed c) has arisen to perform c itself. If, however, B
takes notice of the reduced scope of p3, B must take the possibility into account that A
deceivesB and will not keep its promise p3 and will not show its support afterB would
perform c. (Here uncertainty pops up in the form of a potential misunderstanding:
while B thinks of “support by A” as being visible to other members of S, A may only
think in terms of support shown to B in private.)
At this stage B promises (p4) A with scope S that “B will perform c provided
that A promises B, now with scope S that it will support B once B has performed
c”. If a counter-promise from A to B with scope S, that “it will support B when
performing c” is issued by A then B finds a significant reduction of its uncertainty and
may proceed with performing c (assuming that support from Awill balance opposition
from members of S). Otherwise B has obtained very valuable information: A may not
be trustworthy.
We find that promises are helpful for reducing uncertainty about what can be done,
and what will be done and by whom, while at the same time the mechanics of promises
also creates new forms of uncertainty, in particular concerning trustworthiness. In
some cases such forms of uncertainty can in turn be remedied by way of promising.
Certainty as a concept requires much more philosophical analysis that we can pro-
vide in this brief paper. We refer to [9] for an account of certainty that is compatible
with the aims of this paper.
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Besides promises obligations can be a tool as well for the reduction of uncertainty,
because what is obliged may be likely to happen. Therefore, following the line of [3]
we will continue with an analysis of the relation between promises and obligations.
2.4.1 Reduction of uncertainty through other voluntary co-op methods
An imposition issued by A on B with scope S (containing B) may reduce uncertainty
in all agents in scope and in particular in B about what B will intend to accomplish. It
may also reduce uncertainty about which agent will perform a certain task that many
agents expect to lie ahead of at least some of them. Predictions may reduce uncer-
tainty about an environment. Suggestions may reduce uncertainty on how to initiate
planning, and proposals may reduce uncertainty about preferences between a variety
of suggested options.
A cascade of voluntary co-op methods exchanged between a group of agents may
increasingly reduce uncertainty until each agent feels confident that its plans with be
supported by peer agents according to promises and that occasional impositions will
meet an understanding attitude.
A bundle of predictions may set a stage in which a subsequent bundle of sug-
gestions invokes a pluralty of proposals which in turn are detailed into a network of
promises one of which prepare agents for the exchange of impositions during operation
in real time.
3 Non-obligationism
In [3] non-obligationism has been proposed as a preferred perspective on promises.
This means that promises are primarily viewed in their capacity as mechanisms for
reducing uncertainty and for inter-agent management of credibility, trust and expecta-
tions.
When promises are used as a method for specification and explanation of artifi-
cial agent based distributed systems obligations need not at all appear, and if only for
that reason a non-obligationist perspective on promises is profitable because it allows
one do do without obligations altogether. At the same time the management of cred-
ibility and trust, as well as the determination of quantified expectations for event and
states that are sensitive to various promises from an existing promise bundle need to
be realized by means of sophisticated AI software.
When considering promises as a tool for management science primarily aimed at
organizing distributed human behavior the situation is quite different, on the one hand
human agents seem to have build in capacities for credibility assessment and for trust
assessment and maintenance as well as for the generation of qualified, if not quantified,
expectations. In addition, however, the existence of obligations, however defined, is a
fact of life for human agents. Promise theory can contribute to management science by
making promises available in a systematic way based on a non-obligationist interpre-
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tation. When aiming at a contribution to management science, the interplay between
promises and obligations requires careful investigation which cannot be simplified by
disregarding obligations entirely.
3.1 Pseudo-promissory obligations
Imagine the the following chain of promises:
1. B offers a service s delivered in units (1 hr sessions at B’s office) at a price p
EUR per unit to be paid after successful delivery of the service. The offer is
made as a promise (r1) to a scope including agent A.
2. A promises (r2) B that A is willing to use 2 units of B’s service s and to com-
pensate B by paying B an amount 2 · p EUR within one week after the final
session related to the delivery of this service, and upon having received a written
(electronic) request for that payment from B.
3. B promises (r3) A to provide two sessions implementing both units of service at
successive times t and r.
4. A promises (r4) to appear at B’s office twice at t and r in order to consume the
successive units of B’s service.
Is it the case that any of these promises has engaged A in an obligation to pay B? We
find that there is no such obligation, instead only actually consuming both units of s
engages A in a an obligation to pay.
The obligation for A to pay an amount to B seems to originate from promise r2 or
perhaps from promise r4. It is not directly linked to either of these promises as this
obligation is still somehow conditional. For that reason it may be called a pseudo-
promissory obligation rather than a promissory obligation. Assuming that it is clear
what it means that after having consumed 2 units of s at the agreed timeslots A is
obliged to payB and that such an obligation arises in that manner the link with promise
issuing still is an indirect one only.
This connection between promises and obligations is very common: a conditional
promise expresses that once a condition is satisfied (which requires one or more actions
from either parties subsequent to the issuing of the promise) that state of affairs creates
an obligation.
In the above example the simplest way for A to understand the obligation at hand
is that it coincides (consists of) a bundle of promises issued by B:
1. B promises A that after having received the required payment from A (or on
behalf of A) in due time B will not send any further requests for payment con-
nected to that particular episode of service delivery from B to A,
2. if no payment is performed by A, B will issue another request adding the cost
of so doing plus some amount serving as a penalty, and
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3. if, after some fixed period u yet no payment is made, B will sell (rather than
outsource) the cashing of its once more increased claim on A at some discount
to a third party (another agent) who will seek to obtain the payments from A on
his behalf.
It seems pointless to ask for a deeper sense of obligation than can be specified
by means of this bundle of promises because concurrently A may be complaining
about B’s poor service and ask for a promise by B to nullify A’s costs or even to
provide compensation because A’s problems have not been solved but have rather
been worsened.
Requests for payment may be understood as impositions, like promises such im-
positions may be credible or lacking credibility, stem from an agent that is considered
trustworthy to some yet unknown degree, may be credible and deceptive at the same
time and so on.
3.1.1 Generation of pseudo-promissory obligations
In one insists on the production of one or more “obligations” as a side-effect of a
promise being issued, the idea of pseudo-promissory obligations is that a promise is
supposed to be implicitly extended with one or more conditional promises in the way
exemplified by the case just mentioned.
Thus working with pseudo-promissory obligations involves the application of cer-
tain conventions for expanding promises to promise bundles that contain packages of
conditional promises representing what is often viewed as obligations produced by
a promise but what is now seen as a special class of obligations that can in fact be
equated to (or reduced to) bundles of conditional promises.
Looking at the matter form the perspective of obligations rather than from the per-
spective of promises or impositions we are dealing with a special class of obligations
which merits some further attention.
3.2 Conditionally promised promise patterns
These considerations lead to the following definition of a relevant subclass of obliga-
tions: obligations the content of which consists of a pattern of promises that results as
a side effect from issuing a promise. The fact that the pattern arises is likely to be the
content of previous promises. Such obligations will be called promise pattern based
obligations or PPB-obligations for short.
As long as one thinks of PPB-obligations a non-obligationist understanding of
promises provides a consistent viewpoint. Speaking of obligations as shorthands for
underlying promise patterns or bundles may be helpful and efficient. Because meta-
promises, that is promises to (conditionally) issue promises are promises as well,
promises may create PPB-obligations without contradicting the non-obligationist view
of promises.
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Not all obligations are PPB-obligations, and the interaction between promises and
non-PPB-obligations provides an area for further research. However, restricting atten-
tion to PPB-obligations allows for a useful extension of the non-obligationist view of
promises to the practice and science of management of human operations. At the basis
of the application of promise theory to management science and practice lies the use of
promises that do not create any non-PPB-obligations. There seems to be ample room
for such applications.
3.2.1 Irreducible promissory obligations
Non-PPB-obligations may preferably be called irreducible obligations as the reduction
of their essence to promises is impossible. The promise of a witness in court to state
the truth and nothing but the truth produces a promissory obligation that cannot be
reduced to a promise pattern. In that sense the obligation is irreducible.
Remarkably this obligation comes about after issuing a promise (or a vow) sug-
gesting that even in this case somehow promises take priority over obligations.
3.2.2 Promising without imposing
Although promises may be understood as directionals that create self-impositions, the
implicit tenet of promise theory is that promises alone provide a very flexible tool
for coordination in a multi-agent system. Augmenting promises with impositions and
other directionals is meaningful because it strengthens the expressiveness of the theory
by relieving it from a fundamentalistic focus on promises that seems unnecessary.
Moreover, the addition of impositions to the picture provides additional clarity about
the distance between promises and obligations, which can hardly be assessed without
first assessing the relation between impositions and obligations.
3.3 Promises and impositions versus decisions
In [2] the approach to decision taking from [1] (so-called Outcome Oriented Decision
Taking, OODT) has been contrasted with non-obligationist promissory theory. We
recall that in the terminology of OODT a decision is supposed to be taken by a deciding
agent and the result of that action is a decision outcome which specifies what has been
decided. In another process a decision outcome may subsequently be effectuated.3 In
order to have comparable terminology, it was suggested in [2] that a promise is issued
leading to a promise outcome, the latter being close to what is called a promise body
in non-obligationist promissory theory.
Now a key difference between a decision outcome and a promise outcome has been
identified in [2] as follows: while a promiser is usually expected to be instrumental
in putting a promise outcome into effect (that is keeping the promise), in the case of
3Following [11] decision is subject to a product/process ambiguity, and OODT incorporates a pref-
erence for a process view of decision.
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a decision outcome there is no expectation that the decider will be instrumental for
putting the decision outcome into effect.
In a similar fashion the difference between deciding and imposing can be under-
stood. For an imposition outcome to be effectuated it is expected that the impostionee
will play an instrumental role, rather than the impositioner. A decision is not targeted
to a specific agent. Of course one might contemplate “decisionary obligations” as be-
ing obligations that arise from a decision outcome. Such decisionary obligations are
most plausible viewed as the consequence of preexisting promises about agents being
compliant with specific classes of impositions impositions.
To give an example: if the government of X decides to go to war with Y (the
decision outcome constituting a declaration intention of war), the effectuation of that
decision outcome is based on the military staff having promised to take into effect at
their own responsibility such forms of decision outcomes. Once the declaration of war
DW has been produced, the military staff will exchange suggestions, warnings, and
proposals, and soon the may issue impositions to their subordinate staff members who
in turn will produce impositions down the hierarchy. The compliance with most of
these impositions can be understood in terms of the impositionee having promised to
follow impositions from his/her superiors, assuming a that a correct decision taking
process lies at the root of such impositions.
4 Promise features
Four features of promises were taken into account in our static theory of processes
in [3]. In this section we will provide a number of additional features for promises and
we will propose notations for promises allowing to take the additional features into
account.
1. agents, type, and body (taken from [3]):
• promiser,
• promisee,
• agents in scope (observing the promise upon being issued),
• promise type, promise body,
2. promise issuing coordinates (time, space, phase),
3. promise viewing agent (promise as seen from the perspective of that agent),
4. promise inspection coordinate (time, space, phase coordinates of where is the
promise looked at by the viewing agent),
5. promise validity interval (to be kept in the interval from time/event/state to
time/event/state),
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6. promise identification token (an abstract token in pi-calculus style that links dif-
ferent agent centered views on the same promise together),
7. promise fading out function (describes the degree of fading out of various com-
ponents of a promise notation).
The features mentioned above are independent of trust based reasoning by agents
involved. A calculus of trust and credibility needs to be presupposed for promises to
be of any use.
4.1 Promise statements
A promise statement is an expression that combines a sample of features instantiated
for a single promise. Promise statements that display information about more features
can be developed with ease. Here are some examples.
Base promise form: In its simplest form (called ground form), p[pi: b]q, a promise
statement conveys (the name of) a promiser (p) a promise type pi a promise body
(b), and a promisee (q). These promise statements, though with a more figurative
notation with an arrow between promiser and promise and promise type and
body as a subscript for that arrow, have been introduced and used extensively in
[7, 8, 10]. In this notation p[pi: b]q is written as p pi:b−→ q.
Scope: with S a collection of agents p[pi: b/S]q specifies promise p[pi: b]q with all
agents in S ∪ {p} in its scope. (Promisee q may or may not be included in S.)
Episode: with t and s instances of time (or other situational descriptions from which
temporal and or causal ordering information can be derived) p[(pi: (t, b, s)/S]q
specifies promise p[pi: b/S]q with the additional features that b is supposed to be
kept after t and before r. Thus a promise so specified expires at r.
Issuing time: with u an instance of time: p[u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q provides the additional
information that the promise has been issued at u.
Observation time: with w an instance of time (called observation time) the promise
statement p[w/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q provides the additional information that the
promise statement is considered at time w by an appropriate agent.
Subject fragmentation: Upon its issuing a promise fragments over a community of
agents, that is each agent in scope of the promise becomes the carrier of a frag-
ment of it. A notation for fragments will include a name r of a subject (carry-
ing agent) as additional information. Subject r constitutes the perspective from
which the promise statement is considered descriptive of the state of affairs:
p[w, r/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q is a promise statement that provides the additional in-
formation that it is considered, or held, at time w by an agent r in S ∪ {p}.
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Subject fragment identification: For different human agents the common origin of
respective promise fragments available to them lies in fault prone memories.
For artificial agents additional techniques are available, for instance tagging all
fragments with a secret key α known to the agents in scope only, who may
use a corresponding public key β for calming to an agreement that respective
fragments have the same promise issuing as an origin.
By decorating a subject fragment with that key pair an identifiable subject frag-
ment results: p[w, r(α, β)/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q.
Subject fragment identity binding with alpha-conversion: In a formal or theoretic
account of an agent community making use of shared secret keys, instead of a
key pair involving a public key, and following pi-calculus style process algebra
(see [14]) an alpha-convertible name x may be used with in combination with a
binder (νx)(...). Taking P and Q for names of agents and P [−] and Q[−] for
contexts formed by these agents in which a promise fragment description can be
embedded states are denoted by parallel compositions (P [−] || Q[−] || ...).
Applying the binder and subsequently allowing for alpha-conversion for x one
obtains expressions of the following form:
(νx)(P [p[w, r(x)/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q] || Q[p[w, r(x)/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q] || ...).
Fading out: p[w, r, F/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q adds information about the fading out func-
tion F . This can be explained as follows. Upon haven been created when a
promise is issued by its promiser, the promise statement splits in a distributed
collection of subjective promise statements, one for each subject in S ∪ {p}.
Subjective promise statements will fade out and after some time, which may ex-
tend long after the expiration time of the promise its existence comes to an end.
A fading out function F can specify at each moment u the degree of fading out
(being forgotten by the subject) of the components of the promise.
Fading out for identity carrying subject fragments: Subject fragment identification
can be combined with fading out: p[w, r(α, β)/u, F, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q.
Fading out for alpha-converting identity carrying subject fragments: Fading out can
be described in a formalized world using alpha-convertible fragment identities:
(νx)(P [p[w, r(x), F/u, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q] || Q[p[w, r(x)/u,G, (pi: (t, b, s)/S]q] || ..).
4.2 Statements for other voluntary co-op methods
The type pi need not be a promise type. It can be a type for an imposition or for any vol-
untary co-op method, or any directional. A more general type system including types
for other voluntary co-op methods makes sense and by using typing in that more gen-
eral way the above description of promise statements can be adapted into a description
of imposition statements, proposal statements, warning statements, suggestion state-
ments, and so on. We will omit the extensive details of this matter.
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4.3 Promise context: concurrent existence of directional fragments
A promise, and after its split into fragments carried by various agents, a promise frag-
ment exists in between of a number (may be zero) of comparable entities. The follow-
ing can be mentioned:
• other directionals or fragments of directionals, (with the same or with another
other issuer),
• descriptions of fact, descriptions of opinion, descriptions of contracts, descrip-
tions of obligations, existing in databases each carried by agents involved,
• cognitions of fact, cognitions of opinion, cognitions of contract, cognitions of
obligation (each supposed to reside in the minds of various agents involved),
• wishes, requests, objectives, intentions, plans,
• states of reasoning arrived at by an agent, that is incomplete sets of conclusions
drawn during an ongoing inference process.
In its full generality the range of possible contexts of promises or other direction-
als is so complex and varied that finding a general structure theory of such contexts
is inconceivable. Clarification of structure can only be achieved in the presence of
simplifying assumptions.
5 Credibility versus trust for promises
Once a promiser issues a promise the promise outcome will after some time be assessed
by the promisee and by other agents in scope according to its credibility. That is, given
the kind of promiser and the kind of promise outcome, it is assessed by agents involved
to what extent it is plausible that the promise can be kept.
If that plausibility is considered very low, fading out of the promise outcome is
sped up, and the promise may even be terminated without any assessment having been
made of the promiser’s trustworthiness. In that case it may lead to a negative update of
the promiser’s trustworthiness even without awaiting the time needed to assess whether
or not the promise is kept in cases where credibility was found sufficient.
5.1 Credibility assessment mechanism (CRAM)
An agent noticing a promise being issued will attempt to assess its credibility. In doing
so the agent applies some kind of credibility calculus to its collection (in memory) of
old and new promise statements. We must assume some mechanism that produces
a plausibility that the promise can be kept by an agent like the one who issued the
promise. This mechanism will be referred to as the credibility assessment mechanism
(CRAM).
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The CRAM takes observations on agent behavior, agent classification, and agent
performance as inputs and it produces, given a promise statement an expectation of the
credibility that the promiser will keep the promise taking only into consideration the
type (class, kind) of the promiser (e.g. a human being will not keep the promise to fly
like a bird, or to swim across the Atlantic with out support, or to walk 100 km without
taking food and drinks during the walk. For promise lacking credibility the question
whether the promiser can be trusted is immaterial. However, issuing such a promise
may decrease the promisers trustworthiness in the eyes of the promisee or other agents
in scope of the promise. The CRAM may make use of a credibility calculus that allows
to express assessments in rational values between 0 and 1.
5.2 Trust assessment mechanism (TRAM)
Promises that have been assessed as being credible given the promiser may still not
be kept while other comparable promisers may keep similar promises without hesita-
tion. Besides credibility trust plays a role. Low trust matters only when high cred-
ibility has been assessed. Trust depends on the logic of promiser behavior (if them
promisee thinks that keeping a promise is against promisers self-interest it may lower
its trust that the promise will be kept). It also depends on past behavior of the par-
ticular promiser and it may depend on the size of the scope, as all agents in scope
may lower their trust of the promiser upon observing that a promise is not kept. If
a promiser values high regard (trust) by the agents in scope that may constitute an
additional incentive to keep the promise. The trust assessment mechanism (TRAM)
which is operational as a separate and autonomous functionality for each agent takes
observed behavior as inputs besides a stream of promises. To each promise-promiser
pair it can assign a degree of trust that the promiser will keep the promise.
5.3 Credibility and trust for other directionals
If someone (A) suggests his partner (B) to make a financial reservation for the coming
vacation of an amount of 10.000.000 Euro an immediate clash with credibility may
arise. B may wonder what sort of a vacation might this be about and where is this
amount to be found?
PlausiblyB may react with a warning toA: “that’s nonsense!”. HadA suggested to
make a reservation of 2500 Euro instead, B’s reaction might be to propose B making
a reservation of 3000 Euro. If B reacts to this alternative proposal of A with the same
warning, that may induce a credibility drop in A’s perception of B.
Directionals lacking credibility are routed differently from directionals understood
by the target as having adequate credibility. Only in the second case expectational
reasoning will take place and will induce observational activity that may in turn trigger
assessments impacting on trust levels.
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5.4 Promises and self-trust
Different agents may plan to compute expectations or otherwise quantified plausibil-
ities of future events on the basis of promises and trust in the promiser. The very
promiser, who may or may not trust itself, has a special position among these agents.
Indeed if A promises (p) B with scope S to perform c, a variety of options concerning
A’s trust in itself can be distinguished:
1. A may deceive B by having (but not showing) a lack of trust in itself. A may
even consider itself unable to perform c so that self-trust and self-credibility are
both very low. This does not imply that A has a low self-confidence. On the
contrary, because A has to deal with adverse reaction (degradation of trustwor-
thiness in their eyes) from members of S once A breaks its promise, A must be
confident that it can deal with that eventual consequence of its promise (and in
particular with the consequences of its expected breaking of the promise).
2. Amay have little doubt that it can deliver c and this may be based on information
not available to other agents in S who initially have less trust (than A itself) in
A’s ability to perform c in an adequate manner.
3. A may be overconfident, in which case A is honestly convinced that it will de-
liver c, while other agents in S, who are better informed about the relation be-
tween A’s capabilities and what is needed to perform c, rightly place less trust
in A as a potential actor of c.
4. Most agents in A may have high trust in A’s capability for performing c but A
itself may not be so sure. A may feel having been put under pressure to issue a
promise for doing c that A might have preferred to avoid.
In this case A may feel deceived by some agents in S who promised to make
use of a possibly forthcoming promise by A for performing c. A may think that
these agents should have known that A promising c lacks credibility. Perhaps
performing c involves certain risks that A prefers to avoid.
The interplay between self-confidence, self-credibility, and self-trust can be very
complex. This complexity is real, however, and promises seem to provide a useful
method for dealing with it.
5.5 Quantification of outstanding promises and impositions
Each agent may issue promises repeatedly. Two promise issuings convey the same
promise if keeping one of the necessarily implies keeping the other as well. In that
case promise statements are called equivalent. As equivalent promises may be issued
at different moments in time the corresponding promise statements need not be equal.
When describing a scene promise statements should be made so detailed (high promise
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statement resolution) that equivalence with other promises that occur in the same scene
can be reliably judged.
If a promise statement is abstract, that is it contains relatively little information
about various features, equivalence with another promise statement may be hard to
assess.
Promise repetition, i.e. the consecutive issuing of different but equivalent promises
may impact (that is serve as an input for) both TRAM and CRAM of various agents.
Whether repeated issuing of a promise has positive or negative impact on credibility
and trust depends on the circumstances.
5.5.1 Imposition drift
Once an imposition has been internalized by an agent its life-cycle begins and the
imposition, or rather its residual representation, may transform over time. Agents may
change their view of what has been imposed upon them, including what they have
promised themselves. An agent may invent new promises that it thinks it has made
(while it has not), it may forget impositions created by itself and by other agents. An
agent may have its own strategy for fading out impositions and finally forgetting about
them. These phenomena are captured under imposition drift.
5.5.2 Imposition portfolio
An agent may be supposed to maintain a data base with a portfolio of impositions that it
has received, including self-impositions resulting from its own promises. For a human
agent this portfolio may range from a very formalized and technically well-supported
system to a bundle of more or less vague memories. An imposition portfolio may have
been modified (perhaps compromised) by imposition drift of some of its content.
6 Promise dynamics: examples involving computer pro-
gram usage
Promise dynamics has two main aspects one of which we are now in the position to
illustrate by means of examples. What is shown clearly by the examples below is how
trust updating, promising and promise keeping are interrelated.
The effect of a promise being issued lies in the behavior of the promisee being
compliant with an expectation (in the promisee’s perception) that has been generated
by the promiser upon issuing the promise. The later effect is mediated by promisee’s
trust in the promiser. We will exemplify how that may work and also how different
promises may interfere provided both are based upon the same trust variable.
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6.1 Promise assessment and trust level maintenance
We will consider promise dynamics in a context where some impositions play a roles
as well. The examples below involve a single promise type only:
pi = piα(P, U) = “promises about the adequacy of a product P as a tool for per-
forming task U”.
As a typical example of a product we will consider a computer program. With
Tp(q) we denote the trust that p has in q. We assume that trust is measured on the five
level scale [−2,−1, 0, 1, 2] where 0 is neutral, -2 expresses strong distrust, - 1 express
distrust, 1 expresses trust, and finally 2 expresses strong trust.
We will display several threads of activity involving promises and corresponding
trust maintenance.
1. The first thread illustrates (i) that observation of failure to comply with a promise
leads to decrease of trust in the relevant promiser, and (ii) that with neutral trust
(in the promiser) a promisee ignores a promiser’s promise:
• Initial trust state Tq(p) = 1,
• A promise m0 is issued:
m0 = p[piα(P, U) : “P is adequate for task U ”/{p, q, r}]q,
• q installs P and prepares for the use of P for task U ,
• s imposes q to perform task U ,
• q uses P for task U ,
• q observes that P fails for task U , and assesses that m0 was not kept,
• q decreases its trust in p: Tq(p) = 0,
• A promise m1 is issued:
m1 = p[piα(Q, V ) : “Q is adequate for task V ”/{p, q, r}]q,
• q refuses to install Q (and by consequence to prepare it for task V ),
• final trust state Tq(p) = 0
2. On the other hand, observation of a promise having been kept, induces increased
trust (provided an increase is still possible):
• Initial trust state Tq(p) = 1,
• A promise m2 is issued:
m2 = p[piα(R,W ) : “R is adequate for task W
′”/{p, q, r}]q,
• q installs R and prepares for the use of R for task W ,
• s imposes q to perform task W ,
• q successfully uses R for task W , and assesses that m2 was kept,
• q increases its trust in p: Tq(p) = 2,
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• final trust state Tq(p) = 2.
3. Interleaving both threads makes sense and may allow further progress. Different
interleaving strategies (see [6]) lead to different outcomes. In the thread below,
which results from interleaving the first two threads, the program Q is used by q
for purpose V instead of the refusal of that use by q caused by q’s neutral trust
in p in the first thread.
• Initial trust state Tq(p) = 1,
• A promise m0 is issued:
m0 = p[piα(P, U) : “P is adequate for task U ”/{p, q, r}]q,
• q installs P and prepares for the use of P for task U ,
• A promise m2 is issued:
m2 = p[piα(R,W ) : “R is adequate for task W ”/{p, q, r}]q,
• s imposes q to perform task W ,
• q successfully uses R for task W , and assesses that m2 was kept,
• q increases its trust in p: Tq(p) = 2,
• s imposes q to perform task U ,
• q uses P for task U ,
• q observes that P fails for task U , and assesses that m0 was not kept,
• q decreases its trust in p: Tq(p) = 1,
• A promise m1 is issued:
m1 = p[piα(Q, V ) : “Q is adequate for task V ”/{p, q, r}]q,
• q installs Q and prepares for the use of Q for task V ,
• s imposes q to perform task V ,
• q successfully uses Q for task V and assesses that m1 was kept,
• q increases its trust in p: Tq(p) = 2,
• Final trust state Tq(p) = 2.
These examples of threads of activity illustrate the interaction between trust updating,
assessment and making use of a program which’ adequacy has been promised.
6.2 Trust level dependent reasoning patterns
In these examples agent q performs reasoning in order to deal with the implications
of its trust in p. That part of q’s reasoning proceeds according to a collection of rules.
Here are some rules that may be used to describe control of q:
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1. If p promises the adequacy of a program X for task Y to q and Tq(p) > 0 then q
will prepare for the use of X (provided that has not been done already).
2. If p promises the adequacy of a program X for task Y to q and Tq(p) ≤ 0 then q
will not prepare for the use of X .
3. Given task Y , if
(a) q has prepared for the use of a program X the use of which (for some task
Y ) has been promised (to q) to be adequate only by p, and
(b) Tq(p) ≥ 0,
then q will use X as soon as a request for Y is received by q.
4. Assuming that for some task Y :
(a) q has prepared for the use of a program X the use of which (for task Y )
has been promised (to q) to be adequate only by p, and
(b) Tq(p) = −2
then q will intercept the preparation and unload that program (thus blocking its
by q use for whatever task).
5. If for some task Z:
(a) q has prepared for the use of a program X the use of which (for task Z) has
been promised (to q) to be adequate only by p, and
(b) Tq(p) = −1, and
(c) q has made use of X before for task Z (without unloading it in between),
and
(d) q is requested to perform Z,
then q will use X to perform Z.
In case the first two conditions hold and the fourth conditions holds but the third
condition fails, q will not use X to perform Z (and may fail to perform Z).
6. If q has prepared for the use of different programs for a task Y and is requested
to perform Y it will use that program for which the adequacy has been promised
by an agent with highest current trust, if such an agent exists.
7. If several agents have promised a plurality of programs adequate for task Y
and different programs have been promised adequate by agents with the same
maximum trust (trust in them of q), then upon a request to perform Y ,
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(a) per program sums of trust levels from different promising agents are com-
pared (relevant only if different agents have made adequacy promises about
the same programs) and the “best” program is chosen, and if this criterion
fails to discriminate,
(b) that program is chosen about which the most recent adequacy promise (for
task Y ) has been issued by an agent currently enjoying a maxima trust level
(from q).
Obviously analyzing the validity, consistency, and completeness of this collection
of rules, or an appropriate variation of it, poses a significant problem in itself. It is
reasonable to assume that q experiences a learning curve through which a combination
of such rules stabilizes. Agent q makes use of appropriate informal logic to organize
the application of the various rules that underlie this part of its reasoning.
7 Concluding remarks
We have introduced impositions as a second member besides promises of the class of
voluntary co-op methods, followed by several other elements such as suggestions and
proposals.Voluntary co-op methods are actions or patterns of activity which one agent
applies in the direction of another agent in order to bring about, enhance, facilitate,
or invite, voluntary cooperation. Promises are the key instance of voluntary co-op
methods. Voluntary co-op methods are collected in a more general class of directionals
which may go beyond the coordination of voluntary activity.
We have indicated how, in which cases, and to what extent promissory obligations
(and impository obligations) may be understood as patterns of obligations which are
supposed to be automatically co-generated with promises or impositions.
Then we have extended the notational format for promises know from previous
work to include may aspects that enter the picture when contemplating dynamic as-
pects. These extensions are generic in the sense that similar notations may work for
other directionals.
In Appendix A we provide examples of stepwise development of promise bundles
and in connection with the coming about and effectuation of a plan of an agent to
buy an item from another agent. The example indicates the relatively large number of
promises, and to a lesser extent impositions, that may occur in the context of a simple
plan involving a few actions only.
In Appendix B we provide an example in human machine interaction where a range
of promises, and to a lesser extent impositions, constitute an essential component of
the explanation of system behavior in a context with autonomous agents. The example
indicates that the language of promises is indispensable for the description of some
human machine interaction scenarios.
In Appendix C we carry on with the example on program usage and the side ef-
fects of trust updating. In spite of the open ended complexity of the topic, mapping
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out plausible mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms proves to be doable and
informative.
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A An artificial example of a promise bundle
Many examples of promises can be given. In this Section a fixed running example will
be used to illustrate the relative abundance of promises compared to real actions which
the promises may be about. The example is artificial in that it has not been derived
from a real case.
The example illustrates first of all that promise bundles linked to a single and sim-
ple activity can be quite large, in addition it becomes obvious that most of the promises
must fade out rather quickly in order to avoid unmanageable agent states.
The example also illustrates the use of some other directionals.
A coherent bundle of promises is involved with a single transfer of an amount m
by agent A to agent B in compensation for a service or good S/G that B delivers to A.
• A proposal p1 by B (with B’s management MB in scope) to A to deliver S/G
against compensation m.
• A promise p2 issued by A (with A’s manager MA in scope) to B to accept S/G,
(p2 is a counter promise, also called a promise to use, for p1).
• A suggestion p3 (issued by A) to B (MB in scope) that A is able and willing to
pay B, as a compensation for S/G, via a particular informational money, say IM
(see [4, 5] for informational monies).
• A proposal p4 by A to B to payB by way of a specific informational money (say
IMX).
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• A promise p5 by B to A accept an IMX payment, (p5 a counter promise to the
proposal p4).
• A promise p6 by B (MB and MA in scope) to A a to confirm a payment of
amount m (made by A) after it has been received via an IMX channel by B.
These promises coexist during a single transfer scenario, and in order to understand
the role of each promise a detailed analysis of its dynamics is needed. Each promise
evolves though a life-cycle. For instance p1 may disappear at once if it is considered
not credible to A or to MB that B can deliver S/G. When p1 is considered a credible
promise in principle, given what is known about B in most general terms, A will eval-
uate its trust that B can deliver S/G against compensation m. The degree of trust in B
may be a function of past observed behavior of B by a community of potential clients
who maintain reputation based trust calculus about a number of agents including B.
Updating trust (of B) when a promise (issued by B) is kept or not kept requires a
sound assessment of promise keeping. That in turn requires that promises need to be
wrapped in time intervals and similar constants that enable reliable assessment at some
moment in time.
A.1 Promises about motivation, preferences, and activity planning
Many more promises may be contained in the promise graph surrounding a single
transfer. Here are some promises that may precede p1−7. These promises concern A’s
motivation and preferences. Such matters may be case as promises from A to itself
with other agents in scope.
• A promise pm
1
issued by A to A with the content that A will be satisfied upon
acquiring S/G in exchange of compensation m or below.4
• A promise pm
2
issued by A to A with B in scope with the content that A will be
satisfied upon acquiring S/G in exchange of compensation m or below.
• A promise pm
3
issued by A to A with MA in scope that A currently prefers trans-
ferring amounts via informational money IMX to other means of money transfer.
Another collection of promises relate to the way in which A will interact with B when
preparing the transfer of S/G.
• A promise q1 issued by A to B that A will visit B at time t and location lB with
the intent to be informed by B about the specifics of S/G,
• A promise q2 issued by B to A thatB will receive A at time t and location l with
the intent to inform A about the specifics of S/G,
4Having issued that promise A can assess its credibility as well as its trustworthiness. As a part of
promise dynamics A may initially deem pm
1
credible but upon further reflection A may have limited
trust in its truth.
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• A promise q3 issued by B to A that B will not deliver S/G to any other agent if
that stands in the way of delivery of S/G to A until 24 hours after A completed
its visit to B,
• A promise q4 issued by B that a car (driven by A) can be parked for free at B’s
site whenA announces his/her arrival at the gate ofB’s premises at or after some
time t− u reasonably in advance of t (with u equal to, say, 30 minutes).
• A proposal q5 issued by B that a price for S/G will be fixed turing the visit and
that the offer for S/G against that price will stand for 10 days.
Some promises connected with the (preparations for) the transfer involve A’s partner
PA.
• A suggestion q6 issued by PA to A that A will use PA’s car provided that it will
be returned in time.
• A promise q7 issued by A to PA that the car will be returned at time t + r (at
location lA) at the latest for subsequent use by PA.
• A promise q8 issued by PA to A that the car will be ready for use (by A) at time
t− s (with t− s < t− u) at the latest (and at location lA) for subsequent use by
PA.
• A promise q9 by A to PA that, after returning from the visit to B, A will subse-
quently seek PA’s opinion before promising B to buy/use S/G against compen-
sation m.
• A promise q10 by PA to A that once having provided a positive opinion about
the use/acquisition of S/G, PA will support A to keep the promise to provide
compensation m to B upon delivery of S/G.
• A promise q11 byA to PA thatAwill only transferm toB after adequate delivery
of S/G.
• A proposal q12 by PA toA that PA will be reachable (for A) by phone duringA’s
visit to B.
• A promise q13 by A to PA to make use of proposal q12.
Apparently a rather formidable bundle of promises, proposals, and suggestions may
constitute the context for a single money transfer from A to B. The dynamics of each
of these promises may impact on the very occurrence of the deal between A and B and
the corresponding transfer.
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A.2 Possible extensions of the promise bundle
In practical circumstances a bundle of promises connected with a single activity can be
far more complicated than the example just given. For instance this specific example
may be extended in various directions:
1. A may not have a driving license and she may wish her daughter DA to drive the
family car. This which may be communicated though several promises to drive
her to lb and back.
2. A may not be able to comply with a previous promise to PA about doing some
housekeeping work and an other arrangement may be agreed upon, that agree-
ment being encoded in an appropriate collection of promises issued in advance
of A moving towards lB.
3. A may wish support of PA in acquiring S/G and may try to arrange that support
in terms of specific promises issued by PA that (s)he will help A with the use of
S/G if that might be needed.
4. A may agree with MA upon a strategy for negotiation with B about different
versions of S/G against different prices and conditions. This agreement may
again materialize in a collection of appropriate promises from A to MA and
conversely.
So it seems that up to 50 promises may easily be involved when planning a single trans-
action for buying some good or service.5 The need for an understanding of promise
dynamics is obvious from the need to forget about the majority of these once their role
has come to an end. Instead of logging all promise descriptions agents will maintain
trust about one-another.
B Case study: a recurring parking exit problem
The use of promises can be unavoidable in practice. Here is a realistic case study
where promises arise time and again and the main agent has no other option than to
deal with a growing bundle of related promises.
We imagine a parking lot, say P7 on an industrial site with parking areas numbered
P1 to P10. AgentAworks in companyCA and has been issued a particular subscription
card with the following virtues and features. The parking areas are operated by a
company CP licensed to do so by the local municipality.
5it seems obvious that most of these promises cannot produce obligations because otherwise the
complexity of the whole setup explodes. In fact the setup must be somehow robust against multiple
promises not being kept, and promise redundancy may be vital for plan reliability.
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1. The subscription is called a reduced parking price subscription. It can only be
issued by CP via employers C who provide the subscriptions to there staff mem-
bers.
2. A staff member of a company C pays an annual fee (say 50 EUR) to C and ob-
tains a card in return. The card is named a “reduced parking price card (RPPC)”.
The card provides entry and exit (under certain conditions) to a subset of the
parking areas P1,..,P10 which is made known to the employee via an email,
shortly before the card is physically handed over by one of C’s support staff
members.
3. The standard parking cycle for A works as follows:
(a) A approaches the entry of P7 and hold his RPPC close to a black square
on the surface of a piece of hardware next to the road and in front of the
(entry) barrier.
(b) The barrier opens and A drives into P7.
(c) A searches (and is guaranteed to find) and empty place and parks.
(d) A leaves the car and then walks into his office.
(e) When time to leave has come, A returns to the parking are P7, and ap-
proaches the pay station machine. Then A holds the RPPC in front of the
machine close to a dedicated area for RPPC’s and a price is announced on
a little screen.
(f) Now A must pay. That needs to be done electronically and there are three
options: a debit card, a credit card, or a cash card (so-called Chipknip).
A selection must be made, and is made though a simple and well-known
interface.
(g) A pays and receives an indication that this has succeeded.
(h) A returns to the car and drives inside the parking area to the exit stopping
in front of the exit barrier.
(i) A holds the RPPC in font of a dedicated black area and the exit barrier
opens.
4. Rules of the game. Users of an RPPC are explained the following rules of en-
gagement.
(a) Parked cars must always exit within 48 hours, after that period the issuer
has the right to withdraw the RPPC.
(b) Reduced price is active only between 6.00 in the morning and 23.00 in the
night.
(c) Cars must be properly parked in demarcated locations (quite hard to see in
practice).
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(d) If there is no free space cars are not admitted until place has again become
available, that is until other cars have left.
(e) Payment of the initial fee provides no guarantee that a free space can be
found.
5. Other aspects of the user interface of the parking area equipment.
• When entering the parking area one always has the option to push a button
and to receive a paper ticket and to park at full cost. This option is open to
the public at large.
• At the entry station and the exit station and at the pay station one finds:
– A display that allows some 250 characters of text for messages about
the state of affairs. (The display at the pay station is not identical to
the one at both other stations).
– A button that one can push and which is supposed to provide an inter-
com connection to an operation room where a staff member working
for or on behalf of CP can answer questions, and may provide some
help in case of complications.
– A text with a telephone number that may be called in case of problems.
• Several TV cameras provide the control room staff with information about
what is going on at entrance, exit, and pay station.
B.1 Unproblematic complications
Here are some minor difficulties that may occur with the use of RPPC together with
the way in which these may be handled.
1. If one chooses a way of paying which does not work then after some (very
clumsy) interaction at the pay station one may opt for another mode of payment.
This is important because each mode may fail for different reasons that may be
out of control of a user.
2. If one is refused access with RPPC and is willing to take a paper ticket and pay
the full prices, one will be able to park (provided there is free space). For longer
periods that is very expensive, however. For short visits it may be a realistic
option.
3. If when approaching the parking area the barrier is open and the system is out
of action, say for maintenance purposes, one may enter and park. When exiting
under the same conditions one has parked for free and no one complains. When
exiting some interaction through the intercom system will suffice to convince the
control room staff that remotely opening the barrier is the most reasonable way
to proceed and one has parked without paying.
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4. If when approaching the parking area the barrier is open, one should try to check
in with the RPPC but there will be no feedback as to whether that has succeeded.
B.2 A problematic complication: parking exit problem case I
A problematic complication is a problem for which the user when confronted with the
problem for the first time has no standard way of resolving and the impact of which
may be hard to assess.
• Either the the pay station display states that it is currently out of order, or
• all modes of payment (open to a user) fail for a variety of reasons none of which
are in control of the user.
At this stage we imagine that A is confronted with the simplest case: the pay station
display indicates a malfunction. It is also imagined that this difficulty arises for the
first time (for A) so that A must now find out how to deal with the matter in an orderly
fashion. We imagine thatA plans to leave for a lunch at a friday say 12.00 and to return
at 14.00. When leaving, together with a guest, he finds out that the pay station says of
itself that it does not work. Here is a trace of actions of A following that unfortunate
event.
1. A tries to pay and finds that the paying machine does not work, consistent with
its announced self diagnosis. (The machine has promised to be out of order and
that promise has been kept.)
2. Then A chooses to push the button on the pay station in order to make a call
to the control room staff. (The button represents an implicit promise that such
communication can be achieved after its use.) After some 30 seconds of waiting
a staff member, say Q1cr, responds (the implicit promise has been kept) and Q1cr
asks for the reason to push the button. A explains that the pay station is out of
order and that exit with is RPPC is impossible for that reason.
3. Q1cr suggests A to drive the car in front of the exit barrier and to call him once
more from the intercom next to the exit barrier. (An implicit promise that the
second call will connect to Q1cr again.) A agrees (that is promises to do so) and
the verbal interaction through the pay station is ended.
4. Once in front of the exit barrierA proceeds with solving the problems as follows:
(a) A pushes the button, waits for some 30 seconds and gets connected to the
same control room staff member Q1cr.
(b) A briefly reexplains the problem.
(c) Q1cr states that he will remotely open the barrier.
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(d) A proposes Q1cr to check out his RPPC in “the system” so that it is known
(to the system) that A has exited the parking area (which will allow a sub-
sequent entry).
(e) Q1cr agrees and the barrier opens, A drives forward and is satisfied that the
problem now has been solved.
5. When returning after lunch, arriving with the same guest in the car,A approaches
the entry barrier and holds the RPPC in front of the dedicated area expecting
the barrier to open automatically just as it usually does. Unfortunately nothing
happens and the display indicates that a car is already inside the area (supposedly
via the same RPPC) so that entry is impossible.
A proceeds as follows:
(a) A pushes the intercom button waits for contact, and is connected with staff
member Q2cr to whom A explains the problem, now with other cars waiting
behind him for entry, and A is told by Q2cr that he should now take a paper
ticked and that when exiting the payment at a reduced price can be made
with the RPPC as well after showing the ticket.
In addition A is told by Q2cr that he has probably exited the area when the
barrier was open forgetting to check out. This hypothetical cause of the
problem is denied by A (though to some extent it is true, checkout was not
forgotten but rather it was impossible).
(b) A takes the paper ticket, the barrier opens and A enters P7 and easily parks
on a nearly empty P7.
(c) At 5.30 PM A proceeds to leave again (now without guest) and A notices
that reduced price payment is impossible with the combination of the paper
ticket and the RPPC. Moreover A finds out from the display that exit is
possible when paying full price against the paper ticket (now 18 EUR) or
when paying 73 EUR against the RPPC.
The state of affairs can be phased convincingly in terms of promises as
follows. In response of A’s actions the parking system has produced two
promises:
• Upon entering the paper ticket in the pay station and paying 18 EUR
the paper ticket will be returned in a state where it allows exit (when
offering the paper ticket at the exit unit) within a reasonable time.
• Upon showing the RPPC and paying 73 EUR the system ail allow exit
(when showing the RPPC at the exit unit).
A chooses not to make use of either promise.
(d) Expecting to pay some 3 EUR at mostA dislikes both options andA pushes
the intercom button at the payment station in order to find out how to pro-
ceed. After talking with staff member Q3cr A is suggested to drive towards
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the exit barrier and to reopen the interaction form there. A promises to do
so and after having kept that promise, A succeeds to convince (the same)
staff member Q3cr that the barrier must be opened and that he (that is his
RPPC) must be checked out. The barrier opens and A leaves P7.
At this stage A understands that two promises that were issued by control room
staff have not been kept: (i) he has not been checked out when exiting last time,
and (ii) the promise that he could profit from a reduced price after taking a paper
ticket was unwarranted. A comes to the following conclusions:
• A becomes aware that he needs a conceptual model of the control room
including a perspective on the expertise and capabilities of its various staff
members.
• A understands that intercom connection with the control room staff may
not suffice to solve these problems.
• A concludes that the next time he will phone the indicated phone number
immediately after entering the parking area and that he will take a paper
ticked if that turns out to be needed.
6. On the following monday A enters and exits once more after the same kind of
discussions with control room staff. Now (after having communicated with two
more control room staff members Q4,5cr ) he has found out that:
• Control room staff cannot consistently answer the question whether or not
they can see from their location that the payment machine has declared
itself out of order, though they think of themselves that they can see this by
means the TV camera system while agreeing that resolution is insufficient
to read from the display by means of the TV image.
• Control room staff states that they have no expertise about parking cards,
that is not a part of their job.
• Control room staff cannot check in our check out cars (wrt. the database of
parked cars that underlies RPPC). They can only open and close the barrier
and they can make the machine near the entry produce a paper ticked even
if it has not been requested by the client in front of the barrier.
7. On Tuesday and Wednesday A commutes by means of public transportation.
8. On Thursday, with the third entry after these problems have started A speaks
through the intercom at the entry barrier with staff member Q7cr and is explained
that Q7cr cannot from there solve these problems, and that taking a paper ticket
is the only option available at this stage. In addition A is told that he must find
some higher authority to solve his parking problem with the card. Thus:
(a) A takes a paper ticket and enters.
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(b) A phones the number indicated at the entry and gets connected to Q7cr once
more. Q7cr complains that it makes no sense to phone him twice for the
same issue.
(c) A indicates that he could not know that the button and phone number lead
to the same person and that he saw no other option than to phone the indi-
cated number.
(d) Q7cr reads a A another telephone number (say N1bo) which will provide ac-
cess to relevant back office staff of CP . A promises Q7cr to contact CP via
the second phone number.
(e) Once phoned a person appears who states her name, a piece of information
thatA forgets. After some explanationX understands the problem, and she
promises to check out the car (which according to her can be done when
the car is outside P7 as well as when it is inside P7, and which will lead
to a state from which both entry and exit with RPPC is enabled) and states
(promises) that from now on things will be back to normal.
9. When leaving that day at 16.00 A finds out that the barrier fails to open (the
display also shows, and thereby promises on behalf of the parking system, that
exit can be obtained with the RPPC when paying 125 EUR). He proceeds as
follows.
(a) A drives the car back to a position not standing in the way of other exiting
cars and once more phones the backoffice number obtained from Q7cr now
being connected to another person Y who claims not being responsible for
P7 and that someone else is in charge, who can be reached under number
N2bo a piece of information that A forgets. During the same call, however,
a connection to that person, say Z is arranged by Y and after having been
explained by A the historic account of events Z states that he is indeed
responsible for P7 and should have been in the loop in an earlier stage
already. In addition he readily admits that he is sometimes is puzzled by
the system himself just as well, and that he does not know (though expects)
that once he has checked out the car (a third promise issued but not kept
by CP staff) subsequent exit will be unproblematic and that A should drive
towards the exit and phone him once more if it does note work. A promises
Z to drive to the exit and to try to get out by means of his RPPC.
(b) After haven complied with the latter promise, A is refused exit and phones
the backoffice once more, getting connected with Y , asks for a connection
with Z, and Z now promises A that (i) he (Z) will phone the control room
and tell them to open the barrier and that, (ii) subsequent entry and exit
will be normal, and (iii), more generally the problem will have been solved
upon exiting P7.
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(c) A waits 2 minutes, then the barrier opens and A leaves P7. A notices that
a promise now has been kept kept and A starts trusting Z. A understands
that communication with CP staff unavoidably and exclusively leads to
promises made by them that may or may not turn out to be kept. Misunder-
standing about the content of these promises is very likely to occur, while
analyzing these in terms of obligations is uninformative.
10. On Friday, one week after the problem appeared, A has some doubts about what
to do, trust Z’s promise and go by car, or don’t trust Z’s second promise and take
public transportation, thus postponing the finalization of the issue to another day.
That particular Friday is likely to be a stressful day for A in office. From that
expectationA infers that (the risk of engaging in) extended negotiations with CP
staff must preferably be avoided.
However, because A knows that entry will be easy by means of a paper ticket,
he opts for the car because its saves a lot of time, accepting the fact that he may
have to pay full price for the paper ticket when exiting if after a stressful day he
feels disinclined to negotiate with control room staff from scratch.
11. Indeed (on Friday) entry to P7 is unproblematic with RPPC. Several hours later
exit is possible against the usual reduced price. A concludes, that Z has kept
the second promise as well, and thereupon A inductively infers that Z’s third
promise has also been kept and that for that reason in all likelihood the problems
have been solved in a satisfactory way, so that A can forget all promises that
have been issued in connection with parking on P7 since the first complication
arose at the pay station.
B.3 Trust and credibility
Credibility plays some role in this example: the statement made by Q6cr that he can see
via the TV camera that the display of the pay station indicates that it is out of order
lacks credibility. But that lack is not clear to Q6cr. The statement by Q1cr that payment
at reduced price can be performed with RPPC also after entry with a paper ticket lacks
credibility as the interface of the pay station shows no sign of that option. The promise
issued byX that after resetting (check out, neutralization) of the RPPC, exit is possible
and that this step is insensitive to whether the car is inside or outside P7 lacks some
credibility.
Trust plays a role just as well. A notices that once a promise is not kept trust in
the promiser is decreased almost unconsciously and ale markably. Once a promise
is issued, that seems to create both trust and expectation at the same time. Once the
promise turns out not to be kept, that is the expectation is proven wrong, trust collapses.
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B.4 Lessons learned for A as a user of RPPC at P7
Here are some practical lessons that A has acquired from the episode..
1. Upon entering P7, the simplest understanding of A’s action besides physically
entering P7 is this: A promises to make use of an expected forthcoming promise
to be issued by the parking system, to exit at a reduced price after showing the
RPPC and subsequently successfully paying the amount due.
However, entering P7 does not engage A in an obligation of any form, at least
not in an obligations which can be simply and completely stated. Thinking in
terms of promises issued by A, by CP staff members and by the parking system
and in terms of implied expectations, credibility, and trust, provides a far more
flexible and applicable model than thinking in terms of obligations.
The problem having been solved coincides with A having the car outside P7 and
all promises having been discharged, either kept or not kept.
2. Promises issued by CP staff will necessarily play an essential role when solving
some complications with the RPPC.
3. When A leaves P7 in an irregular way the probability is high that check out has
not occurred in a satisfactory manner. That difficulty will not go away and its
solution requires contacting Z. That should be done at the earliest convenient
opportunity, preferably when the car is outside P7.
4. Control room staff know nothing about the pay station and about the cards and
its underlying information system. But they may not always (or all) be willing
to admit that state of affairs. They are likely to say whatever ends the discussion
without any wish to get it right. Control room staff cannot inspect what is on
any of the three displays without the support of the client’s visual information
gathering on site. On the other hand backoffice staff cannot operate the entry
and exit barriers directly (but they can instruct control room staff to do so).
5. Parking for free seems to be possible for someone who is not afraid of extended
and repeated intercom discussions, and who is not afraid to lie about how he has
operated the equipment and about and what is shown on various displays.
6. A must distinguish 4 categories of CP staff:
• Control room staff, (Q1−7cr in the example),
• general back office staff, (X, Y in the example),
• parking area specialized backoffice staff, (Z in the example),
• on site maintenance staff, (not playing a role in this example, but often
active for solving other problems).
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7. A has no clue as to the scope of various promises. The extent to which dis-
cussions with CP staff and dimply message histories are logged is unknown to
A. Each category of CP personnel has their own views, capabilities and com-
petences. These differences require different styles of interaction from A. Very
different levels of theoretical insight in the issues can be noticed. Control room
staff seem to assume that clients likeA know in detail what information they can
access from their work place. This assumption is unwarranted (at least for A).
Contemplating alternative paths towards the solution of the original problem (pay sta-
tion out of order) several questions remain for A. Answers to such questions matter in
view of a potential reoccurrence of the same problem.
1. At what times is backoffice staff available? In other words are there times of
the day when backoffice staff cannot be reached and problems must be solved
through interaction with control room staff only?
2. If the same problem appears once more, what is the most effective solution? Is
that dependent on the time of the day, is it dependent on the time pressure that A
is in?
3. Is it possible to take a paper tick at entry (simultaneously with checking in with
the RPPC) so as to have a method available of exiting efficiently (though at
higher costs) if the same problem arises once more.
4. Is on site maintenance staff able to neutralize an RPPC? Stated differently: is
asking for the support by on site maintenance staff an alternative for asking for
a connection with backoffice staff.
5. Is control room staff able to switch an intercom conversation to backoffice staff
so that check out can be arranged via the intercom system alone (important when
a mobile phone connection is unavailable).
6. Is it advisable for A to find out the answers to the previous 4 questions before
the same complication arises once more? Or is the probability of these adverse
events so low that learning by doing suffices in the future as well.
Besides these “lessons” there is much room for improvement of the system. Here
are some suggestions.
• Control room staff should be able to read the various displays, and about the
barrier status (probably already visible via TV) and should be informed in real
time about the pay station status.
• Once the pay station is out of order RPPC holders must be allowed exit without
payment and with proper check out. (This requires a software modification.)
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• RPPC holders must be able to check out without further payment when the bar-
rier is open. This may require that control room staff visually inspects the sit-
uation and validates that a car is at the exit. If the car does not exit and the
barrier closes with the car inside P7, control room staff must be able to undo the
checkout.
• If all fails and control room staff must open the barrier while check out of an
RPPC holder is in doubt, oral communication of the card number must be pos-
sible as a valid form of check out.
• Control room staff must be instructed on how to communicate validly about
RPPCs.
B.5 Aspects of promise dynamics
This particular case study features an certain mix of promise dynamics. In other ex-
amples other features may be combined.
1. In the parking example quite a number of promises appear, all of which can be
forgotten by A (and other agents involved) once the problems have been solved.
Only a modified trust assignment byA to various staff member categories results
form the episode.
2. When a promise is first issued by CP staff personnel A assigns a high expec-
tation too its being kept and a high trust to the promiser. The very fact that
a professional member of the parking system staff issues a promise creates a
bonus leading to both initial trust and expectation.
Trust and expectation remain high and unchallenged until either the promise is
kept and trust increases or the promise is broken and trust collapses.
3. Reputation based mechanisms play no role in the example. Degraded trust of
A in parking support staff is turned by A into a change of the model that A
has in mind, thus allowing to deduce that certain promises are lacking sufficient
credibility to rely on. Promises lacking credibility are assimilated by A with-
out further degrading their trust in the issuing promisers because A thinks to
understand why (i) these promisers don’t know how and why not to make such
promises, and (ii) that other (credible) promises made by the same staff mem-
bers are likely to be kept, so trust (of A) has become agent specific and promise
dependent.
4. In all circumstances A has been trusted by parking staff to the extent needed to
resolve acute complications (that is entry and exit). A has no clue as to whether
or not his handling of the difficulties has modified that trust, and if so for how
long and with whom.
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B.6 The parking exit problem and informal logic
In [3] promise theory has been displayed as a subject in informal logic. This line of
thought merits further contemplation. As it turns out the parking exit problem example
provides a number of connections to informal logic. By first analyzing how informal
logic relates to the reasoning that is applied by various agents without any role of
promising it becomes possible to understand some informal logic aspects of promises.
B.6.1 From induction to deduction
A classification of reasoning with some support from informal logic (see [?]) is as
follows: deductive reasoning produces conclusions from assumptions where the con-
clusions are at least as much justified as the assumptions, inductive reasoning pro-
duces conclusions from assumptions where the conclusions are plausible (understood
in terms of subjective probability) relative to the assumptions, and conductive reason-
ing (or pro and con based reasoning) combines and weights the combined impact of
both supporting and opposing reasons for a single assertion.
• The parking exit problem example provides phases where each of these forms
of reasoning are applied. To begin with the trust that the system will work as
intended at any moment of time comes about from inductive reasoning only. It
is certainly impossible for any client to understand al implementation details of
the system to such an extent that deductive reasoning provides the certainty that
it will operate without flaws.
• Real time reasoning, in particular client based reasoning during (problems with)
system use, may start as inductive reasoning and migrate towards deductive rea-
soning. The latter takes place once a client starts developing a mental model of
the parking system. For instance:
1. Consider assumption R0: “If the pay machine display states ‘out of order’
payments cannot be made”.
This assumption may first emerge as a plausible fact in a (learning) phase
where a client tries to pay in spite of the indication on the display. Then
the client may conclude that display status “out of order” indicates with
high likelihood that further attempts to use the pay machine are futile until
the status has changed. After some time the client will used deductive
reasoning from a mental model comprising rule R0.
2. Assumption R1: “exit granted by control room staff will not check out the
RPPC status”.
Again this fact may be a matter of inductive inference first, only to become
an axiom permitting deductive inference once the client has developed a
mental model of the working conditions of control room staff (monitoring
a plurality of parking areas each dealing with different equipment, different
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display systems and error messaging, and with different subscription card
policies).
3. Assumption R3: “when the pay machine is out of order RPC holders need
to check out by way of intercom communication either with CP control
room staff at the exit terminal, or with backoffice staff via the mobile
phone”.
4. Assumption R4: “control room staff is unaware which problems must be
dealt with by backoffice staff, they only think in terms of sending on site
maintenance staff”. R4 is not a consequence of any model of the system, it
remains an outcome of inductive reasoning. The validity ofR4 may change
in time.
• Conductive reasoning appears (hypothetically) in several circumstances:
1. in the case that A experiences the same complication once more now after
working hours, say at 10.00 PM. Now A must determine whether to try to
phone backoffice staff first or to deal with control room staff only and to
postpone formal check out to another day.
2. Conductive reasoning is also called for if A finds the pay station out of or-
der during working hours, but at a moment where A must act under severe
time constraints.
3. If during working hours A (for whatever reason known or unknown to A)
is refused access after showing the RPPC then A needs conductive reason-
ing to determine whether or not entry by means of a paper ticket is to be
preferred.
4. Conductive reasoning is also called for if A prefers to resolve a refused
entry problem by means of interaction with backoffice staff and A must
determine whether or not to allow other persons to park (by driving away
from the entry) before the problem has been resolved.
B.6.2 Induction and conduction on top of deduction
Once A has developed a model of how CP operates P7, it becomes possible for A to
derive the credibility of a variety of promises on the basis of deductive reasoning. (E.g.
control room staff promising to check out RPPC is not credible). Deductive reasoning
may govern to a large extent how A will handle a problem. Then A knows which
promises must be viewed in the light of trust management and maintenance.
Some predictions cannot be made by deductive means and induction remains un-
avoidable in such cases. A typical example is that A may assume that control room
staff cannot connect an intercom exchange to backoffice staff, although A’s mental
model of the system allows for that option. A has inferred this limitation inductively
because control room staff does not mention the option. But the conclusion might be
44
wrong and might prove wrong when tested explicitly. Another example is that A may
assume backoffice staff to be unavailable outside normal working hours. This need not
follow in a deductive manner fromA’s model, but it may follow with some plausibility,
and for that reason it may still be wrong.
Conductive reasoning seems to apply when the same failure is experienced in
slightly new circumstances. It plays a role in plan formation when different priori-
ties or objectives have to be balanced. Promise assessment (in this case) is not a matter
of conductive reasoning so it seems.
Credible promises must be considered in the light of promiser trust. Such promises
play a role in inductive reasoning with expectations not only depending on promise
content but also on the trust A has in the promiser. Reasoning will deliver a quantified
plausibility that the promise will be kept. System behavior will produce assessments
as to whether or not a promise is kept and in either case an update of trust will take
place.
Any high expectation that the system can be used via an RPPC as intended (or
promised) is by necessity the result of inductive inference of some kind. It is unrea-
sonable to expect parking client A to apply a deductive reasoning system about this
subject which is able to deal with system failures. Even when dealing with known fail-
uresAmay need a combination of deductive, inductive, and conductive reasoning each
applied to an approximate model of the parking system and its management practice,
and on top of that A may need both deductive reasoning to assess the credibility of
promises issued by parking authority staff and inductive reasoning to assess the plau-
sibility that promises will be kept. The latter form of reasoning taking inputs from a
current trust level in various staff members (or classes) which is updated whenever it
comes to light that a promise is kept or is broken.
B.7 Parking exit problem case II
A week laterA tried to exit P7 and the pay machine is clearly out of order. A phones the
number N1bo of backoffice staff that was communicated before (see 8d in B.2 above),
and is automatically told (promised) that non-one is available and that after telling
name and number the caller will be called back as soon as possible. That happens
after a few minutes, by backoffice staff member, say Y ′, who asks about the problem.
Upon understanding the cause of the problem and without asking further questions Y ′
connects A back to the control room. Now A, understands that he will be unable to get
anywhere with checking out, and after some explanation he finds control room staff
member (say Q8cr) willing to open the barrier whereupon A exits P7.
Now A still has to check out. Four successive times A calls the backoffice being
told by an answering machine that his call will be answered ASAP, which only takes
place at the next morning. Now A reexplains the entire chain of events to some back-
office staff member, say Y ′′, who, after asking for the card number neutralizes the card
and claims that all will be fine from now. Subjectively A assesses that three out of the
four promises (issued after A’s leaving P7) have not been kept, but P7 management
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may claim that (i) by means of a single return call four promises may be kept at the
same time, and (ii) returning the call the next morning has been the best they could
do. By now A regrets not having written down N2bo as it constitutes a connection that
might yet give access to a living entity.
C Promise dynamics continued
In this Section we will continue with the extensive example from Section 6 above.
We will first expand the notation for trust with aggregates that are specific for either
programs or application areas. Then we will survey a plurality of attributes both for
programs and for tasks that may need consideration in a more comprehensive setting.
Finally we consider reputation based mechanisms for trust modification.
C.1 Extending the trust scale and mechanism
Of course the trust of q in p, denoted by Tq(p) can be measured in a linear ordinal scale
with higher resolution than five levels. Doing so without clear examples of its use is
less convincing, however.
Trust maintenance can be described by making of a family of dedicated trust levels
rather than a single one. Here are some examples, still in the context of programs
P,Q,R, ... supposedly usable for tasks U, V,W, .... We notice that, in the context of
the previous examples, Tq(p) may be understood as q’s trust in p in its capacity of
being a supplier of programs, or in its capacity of being a consultant about programs
that have been supplied by third parties.
C.1.1 Aggregates for specific accumulation of appreciation
Viewing trust and credibility as forms of appreciation, confidence and dependabil-
ity can be categorized as such as well. By focusing appreciation concerning specific
themes dedicated aggregates of appreciation can be introduced for the accumulation
of findings, judgements, and sentiments. Here are some examples:
task oriented credibility: Given a task U , CRq(p, [ ], U) represents q’s view on the
credibility of p as an agent authoritative on the suitability of a range of programs
for task U .
task oriented trust: Given a task U , Tq(p, [ ], U) represents q’s trust in p as an agent
authoritative on the suitability of a range of programs for task U .
program oriented credibility: Given a program P , CRq(p, P, [ ]) represents q’s trust
in p as an agent authoritative on the suitability of program P for a range of tasks.
program oriented trust: Given a program P , Tq(p, P, [ ]) represents q’s trust in p as
an agent authoritative on the suitability of program P for a range of tasks.
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program/task oriented confidence: Given a program P , and a task U , Cq(P, U) rep-
resents q’s confidence that program P is useful for task U .
Confidence is an abstraction (from promiser’s identities) that q manufactures
after having been issued promises by one or more promisers about the quality of
P in relation to U .
program/task matching credibility: Given a program P , and a task U , CR(P, U)
represents a general level of credibility that program P is useful for task U .
An appropriate level of matching credibility may be found from the documenta-
tion of the program.
program/task subjective dependability: By abstracting from (averaging out over a
variety of) judgements of individual agents, a subjective (or rather intersubjec-
tive) trust level can be introduced for dependability.
D(P, U) represents an agent community’s evidence based perception of the de-
gree to which P is suitable for U .
program/task objective dependability: Rather than taking subjective, though often
assessment based, appreciations as a basis for dependability, objective crite-
ria (testing, verification, validation, software process certification etc.) may be
taken as a basis for the development of an attribution of dependability to a pro-
gram/task pair.
Such information may be brought into circulation in a reputation flow based
trust management network by an agent with a high status on software quality
management and assessment.
C.1.2 The meaning of aggregate levels, an outline
For each of these dimensions of appreciation: credibility, trust, confidence, and de-
pendability, the same three key questions can be posed regarding dynamics and impact.
We will provide some provisional answers to these questions:
• What is a plausible explanation (informal meaning) of a level on the five point
scale? We will only consider the program or task specific credibility and trust.
– Task U oriented credibility for an agent p (in the eyes of q) is plausibly as
follows:
-2. (low) if (i) p has no experience with of advise about the usability of
programs for tasks related to U , and (ii) p is professionally connected
with a program producer offering programs supposedly capable of
supporting with task U ,
-1. (moderately negative) if either p is not independent or p is lacking
experience,
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0. (neutral) if p is independent and if in addition p has relevant experi-
ence.
1. (moderately positive) if p has been consulting on a range of function-
alities comparable to but different from U , and,
2. (positive) if in addition to the virtues creating a moderately positive
judgement p has a recognized reputation for the task at hand.
– Program P oriented credibility for an agent p (in the eyes of q) is plausibly
as follows:
-2. (low) if (i) p has no experience with of advise about the usability of the
program P or close relatives of it, and (ii) p is professionally connected
with the producer of program P ,
-1. (moderately negative) if either p is not independent (from the producer
of P ) or if p is lacking experience with consulting about the capabili-
ties of P ,
0. (neutral) if p is independent (in the relevant way) and if in addition p
has relevant experience.
1. (moderately positive) if p has been consulting on a range of applica-
tions of P ,
2. (positive) if in addition to the virtues creating a moderately positive
judgement p has a recognized reputation for consulting on applications
of P .
– Task U oriented trust for an agent p (in the eyes of q) is plausibly as follows:
-2. (low) if q has been wrongly advised before at least twice by q about
programs for task U and the two most recent experiences of p with q’s
advice on this matter were negative,
-1. (moderately negative) if not low and if the most recent experience of
p with q’s advice was negative,
0. (neutral) if p has no relevant experience with q’s advice on the matter,
1. (moderately positive) if p ’s most recent experience with q’s advice
was positive,
2. (positive) if p had two consecutive positive experiences with the advice
of q, and these were p’s most recent experiences with q.
This listing is incomplete because a reputation mechanism may overrule
p’s reliance on its own experience with p. When q is told about two other
agents having very recent positive experiences with q’s advice on the ca-
pability of programs to provide support for task U the trust level may be
raised level may be raised, and conversely.
– Program P oriented trust for an agent p (in the eyes of q) is plausibly as
follows:
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-2. (low) if q has been wrongly advised before at least twice by q about
applications of P , and the two most recent experiences of p with q’s
advice on this matter were negative,
-1. (moderately negative) if not low and if the most recent experience of
p with q’s advice was negative,
0. (neutral) if p has no relevant experience with q’s advice on the matter,
1. (moderately positive) if p ’s most recent experience with q’s advice
was positive,
2. (positive) if p had two consecutive positive experiences with the advice
of q, and these were p’s most recent experiences with q.
This listing is incomplete because a reputation mechanism may overrule
p’s reliance on its own experience with p. When q is told about two other
agents having very recent positive experiences with q’s advice on applica-
tions of P the trust level may be raised level may be raised, and conversely.
• Which events produce updates of the levels?
It is implicit in the above descriptions how credibility levels and trust levels may
change in the course of the interaction with agent q.
• What effects on the handling of directionals can be expected from the different
levels?
Low or moderately low credibility of p in the eyes of q (for consulting service
s) plausibly has the effect that q will not ask p to provide s. In the presence of
positive credibility q may have a preference for an equally credible consultant
who is most trusted.
An example of the working this machinery may read as follows:
In the style of the examples in Section 6 one may imagine an agent p promising
to q that usability of program P for task U , and agent p′ promising to agent q′ that
program P ′ is suitable for the same task.
After agent r has issued the imposition on q to perform U , q looks for an agent c
such that c’s task oriented credibility CRq(c, [ ], U) is sufficient (level 1 or level 2) and
such that among its peers c’s task oriented trust (Tq(c, [ ], U)) is maximal.
Having found c, q proposes that c will consult Q about which of the two programs
is best suited for performing task U . Then c may accept the job of consulting q by
promising q that it will do so, by way of issuing a proposal. Subsequently q promises
to make use of c’s advice and after having noticed the proposal by c for a choice
between both programs q chooses the program to be applied accordingly.
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C.1.3 Product, task, user, and provider attributes
In order to extend the examples of the use of refinements of the trust scale in connection
with the issuing of and reaction to directionals by a plurality of agents we extend the
setting of programs and tasks with additional attributes of both. We will assume that
each attribute is measured in an ordinal five point scale with -2 representing very low
and 2 representing very high.
Below we made an attempt to list a fairly comprehensive collection of attributes
that may arise in the context of our running example. Although only a few of these at-
tributes will play a role in subsequent examples, for the remaining attributes examples
of their use in the context of the exchange of promises and impositions can be easily
imagined.
1. program development time,
2. program development cost,
3. program quality (speed, precision, flexibility),
4. program manufacturing process documentation availability,
5. program system/installation/hardware specificity,
6. program testability,
7. program maintainability,
8. program user base size,
9. program size (e.g. measured in LOC),
10. program dependability (1- probability of occurrence of failure during 1 year of
normal use),
11. task description availability,
12. task ubiquity (many agents in need of the functionality),
13. task complexity,
14. task safety criticality,
15. task evolution speed,
16. user awareness of required task functionality,
17. user dependency on task,
18. user access to alternative program providers for the given task,
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19. user competence for program/task failure detection and diagnosis,
20. provider track record for producing programs for given task,
21. provider size,
22. provider profitability and stability,
23. provider reputation,
24. provider certification,
25. provider software process documentation available,
26. provider software process maturity level,
27. provider software process involves formal specification and verification,
28. provider dependence from the market of given task oriented programs.
C.1.4 Expanding the trust network and mechanisms
We will now expand the setting of the example with the assumption that agent (pro-
gram constructor) CP is the provider of program P , that CR has constructed R, and so
on, and that this and much more information provides a background for all promises
and other directionals about P .
In the presence of information regarding these attributes several additional rules
of behavior can be contemplated. In practice a vast and hardly systematically charted
collection of such rules may underly the control logic of agent q’s assessment and
update of p’s credibility, as well as q’s manner of making use of resulting trust levels.
On the background trust maintenance concerning program providers is needed, and
its relation with consultants (such as p) must be captured in a suitable logic.
1. If p promises q that P is adequate for task U , then program oriented credibility
of p is low and for that reason q may not install P for the use for task U , provided
one of the following (combinations of) conditions is satisfied.
• (i) provider size is very low and (ii) program size is very high, or
• (i) program cost are very low, (ii) program user base is small, (iii) user
dependency on task is high, (iv) task ubiquity is low, and (v) program de-
velopment time is high, or
• (i) program dependability is low, (ii) task safety criticality is high, (iii) user
dependency on task is high, or
• (i) program maintainability is low, (ii) task evolution speed is high, and (iii)
user awareness of required task functionality is low, and (iv) user access to
alternative program providers for the given task is high.
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We notice that many more such combinations of conditions can be found.
2. If p promises q that P is adequate for task U , then program oriented credibility
of p is high and for that reason q will install P and prepare it for the use for task
U , provided one of the following (combinations of) conditions is satisfied.
• (i) program quality is high, (ii) program dependability is high, (iii) program
user base is large, (iii) user dependency on task is moderate, or
• (i) program dependability is high, (ii) task safety criticality is high, (iii)
user dependency on task is high, and (iv) user access to alternative program
providers for the given task is low, or
• (i) program maintainability is high, (ii) task evolution speed is low, (iii) user
awareness of required task functionality is high, (iv) user access to alterna-
tive program providers for the given task is low. (v) provider reputation is
moderate, (vi) program cost are moderate, (vii) program development time
is moderate, and (viii) task description availability is high.
Again we notice that many more such combinations of conditions can be found.
3. If (i) p promises q that P is adequate for task U , then the task oriented credibility
of p is high and for that reason q will install P and prepare it for the use for task
U , provided one of the following (combinations of) conditions is satisfied.
• (i) provider track record for producing programs for task U is high, (ii) task
is of low safety criticality, (iii) user competence for program/task failure
detection and diagnosis is high, and (iv) task is highly user specific, or
• (i) provider track record for producing programs for task U is high, (ii) task
is highly safety critical, (iii) user awareness of required task functionality is
high, (iv) user competence for program/task failure detection and diagnosis
is high, (v) user dependency on task is high, and (vi) task is highly user
specific,
The supply of such rules seems endless, though in practice a learning system might
develop such rules (semi-)automatically and add the rules by need to its rule base.
C.2 Balancing imposition strength and promiser trust levels
In the examples above we have assumed that a request on q to perform a task U takes
the form of a corresponding imposition on q issued by some other agent s. Now
impositions are request for voluntary cooperation, and for that reason q’s trust in s
enters the picture. Assuming again a five level scale for that from of trust one may
wonder how it might interact with the scenario’s as outlined above. Here are two rules
for the interplay between impostioner trust and product supplier/consultant trust.
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1. Suppose that s imposes U on q, then if
(a) Tq(s) = 2, and
(b) q has installed and prepared (only) program P for task U , and
(c) q has been promised that P is adequate for U only by p,
then:
(a) if Tq(p) = 2 then q will use P for task U , and
(b) if Tq(p) = 1 then q will issue a warning to s that its relevant trust level is
positive but not optimal, and wait for a reply by s (either the proposal not
to be bothered and to carry on with using P for task U , or the proposal to
quit complying with its previous imposition altogether), and
(c) if Tq(s) ≤ 0 then q will propose s to withdraw its imposition (for q to
perform U).
This rule embodies the idea that q’s high trust in s is reflected by q applying
maximal scrutiny to avoid s being confronted with a failure when U is performed
by q. Here q prefers not delivering service U to risking the delivery of a faulty
service.
2. Suppose that s imposes to perform U on q, then if
(a) Tq(s) = 1, and
(b) q has installed and prepared (only) program P for task U , and
(c) q has been promised that P is adequate for U only by p,
then:
(a) if Tq(p) ≥ 1 then q will use P for task U , and
(b) if Tq(s) ≤ 0 then q will propose s to withdraw its imposition (for q to
perform U).
Having less trust in s than in the case of the first rule, q takes a higher risk of
failure when performing U with the help of P upon the request by s.
C.3 Reputation infection
The existence of a community Cp of agents, each independently maintaining trust in
p, suggests consideration of mechanisms for allowing q’s trust in p to be positively
affected by the presence of high trust in p for a significant number of other members
of Cp.
If we define p’s reputation within Cp as the distribution of trust in p over members
of Cp, then reputation infection takes place if reputation evolves to modified reputation
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by means of a mechanism which involves comparison and communication of trust
levels between different members of Cp only.
C.3.1 Letter of recommendation (LOR) based reputation flow
In this paragraph we will outline how the spreading out of trust and the conversion of
trust into reputation might work in the context of our running example.
Suppose that q entertains Tq(p) = 0 about p and a promise m0 = p[piα(P, U) :
“P is adequate for task U ′′/{p, q, r}]q is issued by p. Rather than refusing to install
P , q may first propose to q′ a peer of q that q′ tells q about its trust in p. The reaction
of q′ to this proposal determines how q will deal with p’s promise m0.
1. If Tq′(p) = −2 then q′ communicates that fact to q, and q adapts Tq(p) to
min(−1, Tq(p)).
2. If Tq′(p) = −1 or Tq′(p) = 0 it is plausible that q′ refuses (that is promises not
to) send this information to q.
3. If Tq′(p) = 1 then q′ will communicate that fact to q upon which q sets Tq(p) to
0.
4. If Tq′(p) = 2 then that is communicated by q′ to q upon which q sets Tq(p) to 1.
In the latter case it is plausible that q reconsiders promise m0 just issued by p.
This mechanism involves the request (cast as a proposal) for a letter of recommen-
dation (LOR, issued by q to q′ about p). In case Tq′(p) ≥ 1 that LOR is produced by q′
in the form of an imposition (by q′ on q) to take notice of that state of affairs.
This very simple mechanism of reputation based trust generation can easily be
included in the above examples.
C.3.2 Third party survey based reputation infection
A third party u may regularly perform polling of a subgroup Cup of Cp and compute
an average trust level TCu
p
(p) over Cup . Agents in Cp who have no recent observations
impacting their trust levels may prefer to reinitialize their trust in p by approximating
TCu
p
(p) from below.
C.4 Informal logic
We have not made an attempt to display the simultaneous operation of the various
mechanisms. Such matters can be easily imagined, however. What will emerge is a
large collection of rules comparable to the rules that we have given above. Complying
with a large set of such potentially incompatible rules without systematic analysis and
preparation is difficult.
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A human agent based trust management system operates without systematic de-
scription and analysis. When, however, promises, impositions, and other directionals
are used in the design and operation of artificial agents, artificial trust management
cannot be avoided. Designing artificial trust management may involve the observation
of comparable human trust management and rule extraction from such observations.
Rule extraction requires inductive logic. Once under way human agents will be needed
to complement the automated functionality of an agent community in order to improve
and extend the rule set. Informal logic (see [12, 13, 16, 19]) may then be needed to
allow an agent to develop new rule or to modify rules. These matters ask for a combi-
nation of machine learning, informal logic, and formal deduction. Investigating such
combinations is left for future work.
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